seydlitz89
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 You would know much better than me, sonshi
At first glance I would agree, but let us consider also how the 4GW theorists define "war". Since they claim to have a great affinity with Sun Tzu and John Boyd this may be illuminating. . .
To begin with, allow me the indulgence to post some comments on the distinction between Clausewitz's concept of "absolute war" and Ludendorff's of "total war". . . This quote from Professor SC Nielsen's The Public Morality of Carl von Clausewitz explains Clausewitz's definitions of war very well:
quote:
In order to examine Clausewitz’s views on the morality of war, it is important to first clarify how he conceptualizes war itself. In undertaking this clarification, it is worthwhile to go into detail for several reasons. First of all, it is not just Clausewitz’s ideas, which are often clear, but also how he develops them that seem to contribute to misinterpretations of his thought. A key example of this is Clausewitz’s development of the idea of abstract war before he discusses war in reality. Second, the primacy he gives to politics and his trinitarian conception of war are necessary background for understanding Clausewitz’s perspective on the possibilities for, and the difficulties in, limiting the use of force between states.
Clausewitz starts by examining the essence of war as an abstract concept, which he also calls “absolute” war and the “pure concept of war.” In itself, war is “nothing but a duel on a larger scale,” or in a slight modification that clarifies war’s means, “War is thus an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will.” In this abstract notion of war, conflict tends to extremes. There is no logical limit to the force that each side will use or the objectives that each will seek. Even if one side attempts to aim for less than the complete overthrow of the enemy, since war is a series of reciprocal moves, conflict cannot be limited through unilateral action. Finally, there is no logical limit to the means to be used. In a contest for ultimate survival, each side will use their entire physical strength, as well as strength of will.
However, Clausewitz suggests that this war in theory is actually nothing but a “logical fantasy” which is unlikely to motivate actors in the real world. In the real world, war takes place between two real adversaries who have some idea of each other’s power and will, as well as some warning of the imminence of conflict. War in reality is also never absolute because it does not consist of a single, short blow. This is because a nation cannot bring all of its resources, to include “the fighting forces proper, the country . . . and its allies” to bear all at once, and because both sides may attempt to overcome initial shortcomings later in the conflict. Finally, war in reality is never absolute because it is never final -- even a defeated state may still recover. For these reasons, the dynamic that leads to extremes fades, and the political purpose which governs the conflict reasserts itself. This analysis yields Clausewitz’s famous formula that “War is Merely the Continuation of Policy by Other Means.” This result firmly establishes the dominance of political over military considerations. “Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.”
Two other important points should be made about Clausewitz’s definition of war. The first has to do with his intended revision of On War. Based on his note of 1827, Clausewitz wanted to bring two themes out more clearly while revising the entire work. The second of these, that war is a continuation of policy, has already been mentioned. The first is that there are two kinds of war: in the first, “the objective is to overthrow the enemy”; in the second, the objective is “merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts.” This implies that, in addition to the difference between war in theory and wars in reality, there is also a significant difference between kinds of wars in reality. They may be either total or limited based on the political objectives which guide them.
The second point is that Clausewitz has a trinitarian conception of war. Although war is an instrument of policy, its violence means that emotions cannot fail to come into play, and it will always be subject to elements of chance. This means that:
As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity -- composed of primordial violence, . . . of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; . . . and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.
The character of a given war will be conditioned by each of these elements. When exploring the possibility of limiting the use of force, it is particularly significant to note that Clausewitz associates primordial violence with the people and reason with governments. . .
I would only add that Clausewitz has two of the three elements of war as being irrational and uncontrolable, which puts rationality at a distinct disadvantage. There is also a clear distinction between war and peace, the goal of strategy being a return to peace. For Clausewitz as well, war begins with the actions of the defender, since force used against a non-resisting body would not be war, but simply violence, or indeed criminality. War itself is neither good nor bad, simply a reality of the interaction between political communities.
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As for Ludendorff, "All theories of Clausewitz have to thrown overboard. War and politics serve the survival of the people, but war is the highest expression of the racial will to life." Total war is a product of demographic and technological developments. The increased size of populations and the improved efficiency of the means of destruction have inevitably created the totality of war. Total war has no political cause, it absorbs politics.
Now, consider this quote from Greg Wilcox's
4GW and the Moral Imperative . . .
quote:
If 4GW has any form at all, it is like that of an amoeba. It appears amorphous, adapts easily, and transitions rapidly. It can be a terrorist group one day and a guerrilla group the next. Al Qaeda, for one, is striving to achieve chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities, further adding to their potency and threat. Some of us may live to see that happen. 4GW warriors will then be able to operate in the gaps between Western Armies’ comfort zone of conventional war, but their targets are anything but the armies. The targets are the civilians, the infrastructure, the political and social systems, and everywhere there is weakness. . .
While there is something to be said for Meigs’ argument, the environment has changed to such an extent that the application of 4GW presents a threat of enormous magnitude not only to the United States but other countries at the same time. Perhaps, the threat extends to the very culture of the West as Samuel Huntington suggests in his Clash of Civilizations. This is a very different type of war, one which James Woolsey, formerdirector of the CIA, labeled “World War IV”. Speaking to the soldier-students at the National War College in November 2002, Woolsey identified at least three movements coming out of the Middle East: the Islamist Shia, the Ba’athist parties of Iraq and Syria, and the Islamist Sunni. Woolsey posited the theory that these groups have been at war with us for a long time but are only loosely connected if at all. Further, Woolsey suggested that we were attacked for our many freedoms and what we have done right, not what we have done wrong, and the reason we were attacked is that we presented what was believed to be an easy target. Essentially, this 4GW is being fought on a global scale with never-before seen impositions on the freedoms we enjoy. It is fundamentally different from what we have ever experienced in the past, and despite what the President may say, the outcome is not all that certain. The great fear is that we do not have a clue as to how to fight such an enemy. The evidence is on the rebellious streets of Baghdad with the assassination of those who would work with the U.S., and in the hinterland of Afghanistan where opium production, disrupted during the reign of the Taliban, is at an all-time high. . .
This seems very close to Ludendorff to me. It is difficult for me to see any connection between 4GW's view of war, or rather this "World War IV war", and the reality of our situation - which arguably is more that nature of a national war of liberation against our occupation of Iraq, conflated with various terrorist groups whose actions against the US would be better dealt with using primarialy non-military means.
As a student/teacher of Sun Tzu, I think you definately "have a dog in this fight" sonshi . . .
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12-19-06 11:52 PM
